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Executive Summary
Through the Climate Change Act, the UK Government has 
taken the lead in setting emission reduction targets that 
recognise the science on climate change. This must now be 
matched by a strategic policy response. This document sets 
out the basis for an industrial metamorphosis that rises to this 
challenge, based on three recommendations.
1. Energy prices should remain high
Relatively high energy prices in the UK are a challenge for 
the energy intensive industries, and are currently relieved by 
many compensation mechanisms. However, these are applied 
unevenly and reducing the cost of energy to the largest users 
dis-incentivises the changes required to create a low carbon 
future. Instead, energy pricing could be used to stimulate a 
metamorphosis towards a low carbon industrial base. Brexit 
creates the opportunity for new forms of border control to 
allow domestic industry to compete with importers accessing 
cheaper energy. Furthermore, changed forms of energy 
price compensation could be designed to support the re-
substitution of labour for energy that will be required to allow 
the conservation of material value.
2. Focus on supply chains not sectors
The energy intensive bulk materials industries supply 
largely undifferentiated intermediate goods to downstream 
manufacturing and construction. However, this creates waste: 
for example, around a quarter of global steel output never 
reaches a product but is cut off in production, and most 
products use a third more material than necessary to deliver 
the same function. Recent government policy has become 
habituated to this fragmented view. For example, in response 
to the steel crisis in 2016, the steel committee convened by BEIS 
and the All Party Parliamentary Group on Steel2020 consulted 
only the incumbent steel industry with no representation 
of downstream users of steel. A new focus on supply chains 
rather than sectors would reveal opportunities for reducing 
material waste, stimulate the business models that nurture 
material value over longer lifespans and provide the incentives 
for re-shoring missing pieces of our industrial infrastructure.
3. Expand participation in policy processes
Industrial production compatible with the emissions 
reduction targets of the Climate Change Act and without the 
artifice of “off-shoring” could be rich, creative and satisfying 
but will be quite different to today’s production of short-term 
commodities sold to disengaged users. Preparation for the 
required industrial metamorphosis can begin now, through 
developing experience of different relationships between 
users and suppliers, through new attention to the design of 
quality in jobs, and through expanding policy evaluation 
beyond the use of short-term economic models that dominate 
today’s policy choices. As policy interest in the bulk materials 
spans many Whitehall departments, this document specifically 
recommends the creation of a national Materials Forum, 
modelled on the Energy Research Partnership, to stimulate 
creative public-private dialogue on materials policy.
The UK’s manufacturing industries have largely declined since 1980, but the globalised industry that serves our 
expanding demand was developed on the assumption of an energy supply without consequences. In the twenty 
first Century, either the impacts of harmful climate change or the proactive policies of mitigation will lead to 
a radical reconfiguration of production. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Britain led the world with 
the first industrial revolution, as the first nation to harness fossil fuels for a great expansion of production. This 
document proposes that in the twenty first century, Britain could lead a second revolution, a metamorphosis from 
today’s shrunken domestic industry to leadership in production fit for a low carbon world. In the short term, this 
metamorphosis can begin with a focus on supply chains rather than sectors to eliminate hidden wastes, by strategic 
use of energy pricing and by expanding participation in the design of industrial policy. In preparation for a broader 
industrial transformation new alliances and engagement could be stimulated aiming to place environmental 
sustainability and quality of life at the heart of industrial purpose. The document concludes with responses to 
specific questions raised in the Green Paper.
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The emissions predicament
Current targets reward UK industrial closure
Both the UK Climate Change Act and the country level 
commitments under the UNFCCC Paris Accord allocate 
emissions on a territorial basis. Countries are responsible for 
emissions that occur within their borders, not for emissions 
that arise due to the goods and services demanded by 
their citizens. Fig 1 shows that in 1997 this allocation 
underestimated the UK’s carbon footprint by approximately 
a third. By 2013 the gap had increased to 50% of territorial 
emissions. Aside from the effect of the global financial crisis in 
2008, UK consumption emissions have grown steadily, rising 
by 3% in the most recent data year 2012-2013. Setting targets 
on the basis of production rather than consumption emissions 
rewards industrial closure in the UK. In contrast, if the UK took 
responsibility for the emissions associated with its purchasing, 
its climate targets would align with a strategy promoting a 
new industrial transformation based on efficient material use, 
fit for purpose in a low carbon future. 
One third of the energy and process related greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with our purchasing arise from industrial 
production. The energy intensive bulk material industries 
that release most of these emissions are already highly 
efficient and in the foreseeable future it is unlikely that they 
will be powered by low carbon sources. Mitigating industrial 
emissions therefore requires making less of the bulk materials. 
We could live well with much less material production but our 
industrial system is not currently motivated to achieve this1.
Targets are starting to bite
Within the UK, carbon constraints are becoming truly binding. 
Suppressed demand following the financial crisis, the phase 
out of coal in the power sector, changes in the UK industrial 
structure and the modest but growing contribution of 
renewables to the National Grid have allowed us to meet the 
first three UK Carbon Budgets2. UK production emissions in 
2015 were 38% below 1990 levels exceeding the requirements 
of the 2nd and 3rd Carbon Budgets. However in their latest 
report to Government the Committee on Climate Change 
found current government policies were unlikely to meet the 
requirements of the 4th and 5th Carbon budgets.
The Government has recognised that current plans are 
insufficient but is yet to publish its Emission Reduction Plan. 
The “policy gap” identified by the Climate Change Committee 
creates a real opportunity for the UK government to act to 
ensure that businesses and consumers face appropriate 
incentives to deal with the pressing problem of Climate 
Change now.
By setting a binding emission reduction target into law through the 2008 Climate Change Act, the UK government 
has shown great leadership in recognising the science on Climate Change. However, the definition of the target 
treats industrial closure in the UK as a success by avoiding responsibility for emissions released in other countries 
to make goods purchased in the UK.  Despite stringent target-setting, there has been insufficient action to deliver 
change and it is unlikely that we will meet even the narrow production-emissions based targets. International 
agreements to limit global temperature increases to less than 2°C will require a different approach. A UK Industrial 
Strategy must have this challenge at its heart in order to put UK businesses at the forefront in a future carbon-
constrained world.
Fig 1: UK GhG emission attributions 1997-2013  (Defra, 2016)
Fig 2: The “policy gap” identified by the CCC in the context of Brexit (CCC, 2016)
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No CCS means tackling climate change head on
Climate Change is a problem that arises from cumulative 
greenhouse emissions: it is the stocks of carbon in the 
atmosphere that cause changes in temperature, not emissions 
in any particular year. It is not just the 2050 target that matters 
but the entire greenhouse gas emissions pathway in the period 
up to 2050: higher emissions in one period mean that more 
stringent reductions must be made in later periods. Globally, 
emissions associated with the continued use of fossil fuels, 
industrial activity and land use change reduce the permissible 
stock of emissions that can ever be released by 3-6% a year. 
At this rate the entire stock of permissible emissions that 
are consistent with the “less than 2°C” target set by the 
international community in the Paris Accord will be exhausted 
in 16-33 years3.  As difficult decisions on Climate Change are 
delayed by the international community, the “carbon debt” 
that has to be repaid in future periods is rising. Today’s inaction 
is imposing on the next generation a high-risk burden of “net-
negative” emissions. Indeed 87% of the scenarios that meet 
a 2°C target in the IPCC’s fifth assessment report require net 
negative emissions in the second half of this century4. 
By permitting reliance on largely unproven technologies the 
integrated assessment models that generate the  IPCC scenarios 
risk exaggerating the technical and commercial viability of 
these technologies and fail to emphasise the urgent need for 
change now. Concerns over the viability of these technologies 
include: two decades of R&D have struggled to demonstrate 
the technical and economic viability of fossil fuel CCS; 
additional problems will arise when attempting to substitute 
relatively homogenous fossil fuels with heterogenous biomass 
feedstocks (for Biomass-CCS, the key technology that hopes 
to deliver net-negative emissions); vast land areas (one or 
two times the area of India) would be required to grow the 
required feedstock raising concerns over carbon neutrality, 
land availability and food production; little thought has been 
put into the logistics of collating and transporting these vast 
quantities of bioenergy5.  Three attempts to fund CCS pilot 
plants in the UK have failed. By withdrawing funding for these 
technologies in the 2015 Spending Review, the Government 
has implicitly put great emphasis on immediate, radical 
changes on the demand and the supply-side6. The Industrial 
Strategy green paper does not reflect this urgency.
Unilateral action risks carbon leakage
Rising energy costs as a result of climate policies were sited as 
one of the reasons for the closure of the Redcar steelworks in 
Teeside in 2015, putting 3,000 people out of work and ending 
production just before the plant’s centenary year7. There is no 
advantage to the environment if climate change policies in 
the UK cause the relocation of businesses to regions with less 
stringent environmental policies. However, current policies on 
climate change are implemented within the wider context of a 
changing competitive landscape: UK industrial productivity is 
low (with output per hour worked 25% below that in the USA); 
the global steel industry is suffering from severe overcapacity 
(with prices halving 2008-2016); fluctuations in exchange rates 
cause problems for exporters when the pound appreciates (as 
was the case in the run up to the sale of Redcar) and benefits 
exporters when the pound depreciates (as was the case in the 
immediate aftermath of Brexit when Tata announced a U-turn 
on the planned sale of  the steelworks at  Port Talbot). 
As shown in Fig. 3 energy costs in the UK are high compared 
to the rest of Europe. A third of these costs are due to 
environmental policies, but once compensation schemes are 
taken into account the effect of these policies is modest. For 
example environmental policies, and their compensation 
schemes, increase the cost of steelmaking by approximately 
0.1%8. 
If UK businesses are to adapt to a carbon-constrained world 
they must face appropriate energy price signals that incentivise 
energy and material efficiency and relay information on where 
to prioritise efforts. However these signals must not place UK 
businesses at a competitive disadvantage to their international 
competitors.
Fig 3: International industrial energy cost comparison
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1. Energy prices should remain high
Energy prices should include environmental costs 
in order to encourage demand-side responses
Higher energy and material prices offer incentives for the more 
frugal use of energy and materials. Ideally these prices should 
increase to reflect the social cost of upstream greenhouse 
gas emissions that are “embodied” in energy, material and 
intermediate inputs. This would provide appropriate incentives 
for substitution towards lower impact inputs and innovation 
to improve the efficiency with which inputs are used. It 
would also raise prices of emissions intensive final goods, 
encouraging consumers to reconsider the bundle of goods 
they purchase. However, increasing prices of core commodity 
goods can be both socially and commercially destabilising: 
higher energy prices have greatest impact on lower income 
households who pay proportionately more of their income on 
energy, and even modest increases in energy costs put a strain 
on companies operating in cost competitive environments. 
The opportunity for Government is to avoid implementing 
hasty, reactive compensation schemes when prices start to 
bite, and instead to explore options to use the full range of 
fiscal instruments to maintain incentives for effective change, 
compensating for losses without distorting incentives for 
demand-side responses.
Carbon prices should set a level playing field and 
maintain downstream incentives
In the absence of a single global carbon price, industry faces 
a patchwork of carbon pricing policies. Globally there are now 
38 distinct carbon-pricing schemes that cover approximately 
12% of global emissions9. Businesses within the UK are subject 
to two carbon pricing schemes: the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS, a market price currently at about £5/
tCO2) and the UK Carbon Price Support (UK CPS, a floor price 
that supports the EU-ETS by imposing a minimum carbon price 
of £18/tCO2 on electricity generation in the UK. As shown in 
the box story opposite (‘Perverse UK Carbon Pricing for Steel’), 
these two prices distort incentives by taxing different processes 
at different carbon prices and by generously compensating for 
carbon costs, reducing incentives for downstream emissions 
abatement10. What is needed is a carbon price that is levied 
consistently across sectors internationally through border 
taxes implemented for example through the Inclusion of 
Consumption method described in below. In a recent article in 
the Financial Times Lakshmi Mittal, chairman of ArcelorMittal 
called for exactly this type of intervention11.
Fiscal instruments should be used to aid the 
transition
It is common rhetoric that it is not the role of Government 
to interfere with what people and companies choose to buy. 
However, in order to raise revenues to provide public services 
and redistribute income, governments design tax schemes that 
significantly affect demand-side choices. For example, income 
taxes raise the cost of labour, disincentivising the substitution 
of labour for emissions intensive materials in industry.  Within 
the UK, labour taxes increase labour costs by approximately 
a third. According to Aidt et al (2017) a 1% increase in the 
price of labour causes a 0.88% increase in the use of materials 
in the construction sector and a 1.48% increase in the use of 
materials in the automotive sector. Crudely extrapolating 
these substitution elasticities would suggest that labour taxes 
The 2008 Climate Change Act requires that businesses in the UK reduce emissions. Re-locating the emissions 
intensive industries to achieve reduction targets does nothing to help the climate and disadvantages proactive 
communities. However a “race to the bottom” risks destabilising the climate, threatening living standards of all 
future communities. The proposal in the Industrial Strategy green paper to minimise industrial energy costs will 
hinder efforts to promote greater efficiency in the use of energy and emissions intensive materials that are vital 
if the emission reduction targets set out in UK law are to be met. Rather than compensating downstream sectors 
for rising upstream energy costs the Government should seek alternative compensations that are compatible with 
the environmental constraints that have been set into UK law and that allow fair competition in trade, whilst 
stimulating innovation towards a materially efficient future.
PROPOSAL: BORDER TAXES
Neuhoff et al. (2016) propose the ”Inclusion of consumption” method to 
reinstate the carbon price in downstream sectors and tax embodied emission 
intensive materials at the border. Under the proposed scheme, emissions 
allowances are issued to energy-intensive industries for free under the EU ETS, 
based on a benchmark plant efficiency. These sectors are not expected to pass 
on the opportunity cost associated with this free allocation. Instead a charge 
(dependent on the average carbon intensity of production) is levied on the 
consumption of carbon intensive materials. This charge is levied on domestic 
and imported products alike, and takes the form of a liability that is only paid 
when the good is ”released for consumption” i.e. sold to a final consumer or 
exported. By applying the same levy on domestic and foreign producers, this 
scheme sets a level playing field and is compliant with WTO standards. 
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increase material demand by 29% in the construction sector 
and 48% in the Automotive sector. This illustrates the fact 
that fiscal policy across the board has sizeable impacts on the 
decisions of households and firms and on the environmental 
consequences of production. 
The box story to the side explains how in Sweden fiscal 
policy is used actively to encourage demand-side behaviours 
that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Brexit offers similar 
opportunities in the UK e.g. reducing the 20% VAT on building 
repairs that currently disincentivises the retention, restoration 
and revitalisation of the historic building stock12.
What can Government do?
The Industrial Strategy green paper proposes a long-term road 
map to minimise business energy costs while also “working 
with stakeholders to explore opportunities to reduce raw 
materials demand and waste in our energy and resource systems”. 
These two aims are incompatible. Businesses are used to 
responding to price signals and these signals offer important 
information on where to prioritise effort. We suggest that the 
Government instead focuses on ensuring that price signals 
operate effectively and that, where necessary, businesses 
are compensated without unduly distorting incentives. In 
particular, we recommend that the Government should:
• Listen to calls from business leaders to create a level 
playing field by implementing carbon taxes at the border 
e.g. through the Inclusion of Consumption method. 
• If the above is not possible, consider alternative forms 
of compensation for the cost of carbon that are not 
dependent on energy use. The current compensation 
mechanisms for indirect carbon costs weaken incentives 
for demand-side innovation.
• Introduce a more flexible system for varying VAT and other 
taxes to allow these instruments to be used strategically 
to aid the transition to a zero-carbon economy.
• Set a requirement for the Committee on Climate Change 
to include a report on UK consumption emissions along-
side UK territorial emissions in its annual report to the UK 
Government to avoid treating industrial closure in the UK 
as an environmental success story.
INNOVATIVE FISCAL POLICIES IN SWEDEN
In Sweden there are strategic exemptions from particular taxes that reduce 
incentives for material efficiency. VAT on repairs to certain goods has been 
reduced from 25% to 12% and the governing Social Democratic-Green coalition 
has proposed measures to waive income taxes on repairs to appliances such as 
fridges, ovens and washing machines. These measures are explicitly aimed at 
reducing material consumption with a view to reducing embodied greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
PERVERSE UK CARBON PRICING FOR STEEL
The Figure below shows a perverse situation. Differences in the taxes and 
compensation applied by the UK Carbon Price Support and the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme lead to steel recyclers paying a higher effective carbon price 
than primary steel makers. Yet recycling steel causes only a third of the emissions 
per tonne of steel.
The compensations offered for these costs limit incentives for downstream 
energy and material efficiency. At least 95 % of EU ETS allowances are allocated 
to the UK steel sector for free, and BEIS offer compensation for up to 85% of 
indirect carbon costs borne by energy intensive sectors that are prone to carbon 
leakage (ie competition with importers with cheaper energy). Given intense 
price competition, the steel industry claims that it cannot pass on focally 
applied carbon costs to its customers. If this is the case, then material prices 
will not increase, and downstream sectors will not face appropriate incentives 
to innovate.
Fig 4: Carbon prices and compensations by steelmaking process (Skelton & Allwood, 2017)
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2. Supply chains not sectors
There is abundant technical opportunity to improve 
material efficiency 
There are ample technically viable opportunities to improve 
the efficiency with which materials are used. Fig 5 shows crude 
steel demand for an office block and a car, distinguishing 
between steel that is scrapped as yield losses during the 
production processes, steel that is technically surplus to 
requirements and steel that is required to deliver the product 
function. In both examples less than 50% of the steel that is 
bought is technically required in the final product.
A supply-chain approach for steel?
Taking the example of steel, a “sector deal” may see calls for 
support for existing predominantly primary steelmaking 
plants in the UK that are suffering due to global overcapacity. 
An alternative, supply chain deal could see UK scrap merchants 
– who are due to see a buoyant market as the construction 
boom of the late 1970s turns into a boom in demolition 
waste and recycling – working with secondary steelmakers 
to integrate the currently fragmented upstream scrap 
markets. As explained in the box stories over-leaf, improved 
supply-chain coordination with downstream sectors such 
as the construction sector and the automotive sector could 
then ensure improved efficiency in the use of materials. Fig 
6 shows how key decisions taken by designers have a large 
bearing on material demand but are made before material 
cost reduction becomes a priority. Taking an integrated supply 
chain approach and facilitating a dialogue between design 
and delivery would help to align incentives and overcome 
information asymmetries.
What can Government do?
• Convene supply chain discussions to evaluate sector 
deals by focussing on delivering solutions rather than 
intermediate goods.
• improve metrics to allow evaluation of material utilisation 
along supply chains making sure that we extract maximum 
value from the materials we use.
• Foster “design for manufacture” skills and improve the 
dialogue across the supply chain between design and 
delivery.
• Engage in a strategic effort to rejuvenate the UK 
equipment manufacture sector, a key missing sector that 
could benefit from supply chain innovation in the UK e.g. 
through a High Value Added Manufacturing Catapult. 
Focusing Government support on sectors through the proposed “open door” policy risks lock-in to entrenched 
business practices. Choosing instead to focus on supply chains could release opportunities by channeling efforts 
to meeting consumer demands – for comfort, mobility, status and enjoyment - in a more efficient manner. The 
energy intensive bulk materials industries supply largely undifferentiated intermediate goods to downstream 
manufacturing and construction. This causes both waste and over-design: most products use approximately a 
third more material than necessary to deliver their function.  Firms have strong incentives to optimise within their 
current operations (or risk losing out to competitors) but there is little incentive to change supply chain practices. 
Materials could be used much more efficiently but options for change must be identified and evaluated at the 
supply chain not at the sector level. Government could play a key role in facilitating this dialogue. 
Fig 5: Excess steel in products13
Fig 6: Key decisions that affect material demand13
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CASE STUDY: Resource efficiency through improved supply 
chain coordination in Construction
Structural engineers routinely over-specify steel relative to technical 
requirements: case studies that analyse the efficiency with which steel is used in 
buildings (its ‘utilisation’) reveal that 36-46% of steel is surplus to requirements. 
Fig 7 shows how the distribution of beam utilisation in 27 case study buildings 
differs across stages of design.
The figure shows that the average utilisation increases from 60% (on average 
40% of steel is surplus to requirements) to 80% (20% of steel is surplus to 
requirements) between the preliminary and the tender stage, but that there 
is little change between tender and construction. After the tender stage most 
of the work involves integrating the services and detailing by the structural 
engineer and connection design by the fabricator. Although connection design 
can significantly reduce beam requirements there appears to be no feedback 
loop that allows the beam specification to be revisited once connection design 
is finalised.
Over-specifying steel relative to technical requirements could reduce costs 
if reducing the variation in beam specification results in cost savings due 
to economies of scale in fabrication. However, recent research has revealed 
that fabricators have little difficulty coping with complex orders and that 
bulk discounts by beam type are relatively small. Instead, it is likely that over-
specification occurs as a defensive design practice by structural engineers who 
seek to guard against changes in requirements during the design process. Some 
built in redundancy is inevitable to cope with unforeseen changes to design 
requirements but this should be evaluated across the supply chain on a project-
by-project basis and not be the result of a rule of thumb applied universally by 
structural engineers.
Fig 7: Beam utilisation at different design stages (Dunant et al. forthcoming)
CASE STUDY: Resource efficiency through improved supply 
chain coordination in the Automotive sector
Yield losses within the automotive sector range from 30% to 57% with a 
production volume weighted average of 44%. Yield losses occur across a range 
of companies and processes. For example the case study car described in Fig 8 
was made from 15 different steel alloys and 6 different aluminium alloys with 
different gauges, coatings and pre-treatment requirements. In all, 100 different 
sheet metal coils were used to produce 385 components across 21 business 
units in 13 corporations.  
Horton & Allwood (forthcoming) identify four key stages of car design: 
design strategy; component design; manufacturing design and component 
manufacture. Despite initial design decisions having a large bearing on vehicle 
weight and yield, material utilisation is only formally considered in the latter 
two design stages. In particular there is a trend towards increasing component 
capability through designing and manufacturing complex component 
geometries. This leads to increased yield losses.
Opportunities to improve yield include: changing part shape, changing part 
nesting and increasing nesting options. Realising these opportunities requires 
improved feedback between component manufacturers and car designers. Such 
feedback could explore the opportunity for improving yield through acceptable 
changes in design e.g. seeking opportunities to rationalise the grade, gauge and 
coating specification of components within a particular vehicle to increase the 
opportunity to nest parts.
Fig 8: Yield losses in the automotive supply chain (Horton et al. forthcoming)
Edge Secondary
Secondary
Edge Primary
Primary Core/Trimmer/Tie
Preliminary                                Tender                              As built and 
construction
0%
100%
Raw Material Blanks Trimmed
Final parts Scrap
Industrial Metamorphosis8
3. A new form of participation
Making the most of fleeting moments of change
Evidence on Policy entrepreneurship shows that policy changes 
during brief windows of public interest, political opportunity 
and policy readiness. Often, precisely when there is a political 
appetite for change in response to an immediate problem, 
there is little time to engage stakeholders and develop policy 
alternatives. As a result there is a tendency towards consulting 
incumbent industry players and perpetuating the status quo, 
rather than taking the opportunity to reconfigure supply 
chains. 
A new form of participation
It is vital to reenergise the policy process to allow a richer set 
of ideas to be evaluated and ensure policy readiness during 
fleeting moments of change. The idea of a policy funnel, 
similar to the design funnels used to scope ideas for product 
design, shows how options to meet an initial agenda set 
by government can be developed into a set of actionable 
policies. This should be an ongoing process that generates 
a bank of ideas that can be drawn upon at times of crisis, 
avoiding opportunistic, reactive policy-making that tends to 
be backward looking and favour incumbent players.
What can Government do?
• Create a Materials Forum (see below) that comprises a 
broad range of stakeholders including businesses that 
represent the full range of supply chain interests, trade 
union representatives and other stakeholders.
• Aim to influence the negotiations under Brexit and 
the associated trade-deals to make the most of this 
opportunity to shape the competitive landscape to 
acknowledge environmental constraints.
The UK Government and Civil Service are facing unprecedented pressure in negotiating Brexit and associated trade 
deals. These negotiations could be an opportunity to further an industrial metamorphosis in the UK, but there is a 
risk that the systemic opportunities for industrial change that could put UK industry at the forefront of the transition 
to a carbon constrained world may be overlooked in the urgency of negotiation. The policy development process 
has little bandwidth to respond in times of crisis and yet it is precisely during these times that there is greatest 
opportunity for change. We could be better prepared for change by proactive policy design, and by engaging a 
wider participation in policy development processes, including employees and communities.
Fig 9: The potential for policy entrepreneurship (based on Cooper et al. forthcoming)
Fig 10: The policy funnel
PROPOSAL: MATERIALS FORUM
The Government should establish a cross-Whitehall Materials Forum, comprising 
a broad range of stakeholders within material-using supply chains to facilitate an 
inclusive dialogue and evaluate the issues relating to role of materials in society. 
The Materials Forum could set the strategy for a National Materials Catapult, 
explore opportunities to reformulate policies following Brexit and establish a set 
of National Accounts for materials at a relevant level of detail to inform decision-
making today and in the future.
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Quality of work and material goods 
The first industrial revolution led to a commoditisation of work, with 
managers designing tasks to be repeated without variation by disempowered 
employees. More recently, the ubiquity of computers has created a different 
homogenisation of the experience of work, disconnected from material reality. 
Yet the design of jobs is a social choice and one which could be re-examined to 
the benefit of employer and employee alike.  In parallel, the societal benefits of 
the informal economy and voluntary work merit more attention. Government 
agencies focused on reducing  unemployment could be used to expand our 
understanding of satisfying formal and informal work.
Recent focus on income metrics creates a monochrome view of quality in 
material goods. Local planners, for example, have significant potential to 
influence the heritage and social value of the built environment yet are 
frequently subordinate to developers whose goals of immediate profit obviate 
opportunities to create civic monuments and a built legacy to rival that of the 
first industrial revolution.  At a smaller scale, there is a growing body of evidence 
that goods that invite user participation, for example through personalised 
styling, repair or adaptation, are kept for longer and have greater value to their 
owners. Government actions could support changed planning priorities and 
explore a wider basket of measures of material wealth, including measures of 
stocks and quality.
Participation in corporate and policy processes
Recent industrial policy processes have typically been reactive, driven by 
a short term crisis, and are therefore reduced to a rapid dialogue between 
unprepared civil servants and incumbent corporate interests.  A wider dialogue 
with employees and local communities could allow a broader preparedness and 
allow greater agility in responding to future crises. 
A STRATEGIC AGENDA FOR THE MATERIALS FORUM
Whether driven by a climate crisis or by mitigation policy, global industry will in future make less material. The UK could be a leader of 
the required industrial metamorphosis. However, this change requires a different relationship between consumers and producers and at 
present there is limited political appetite for strongly directive industrial policy.  The actions proposed so far in this document could be 
implemented today, but in preparation for stronger policy in future, government actions now could: examine the quality of work and of 
material goods in preparation for developing future metrics of policy; stimulate a wider participation of employee and community groups 
in corporate and policy decision making; challenge the inappropriate use of narrowly validated economic models for strategic policy 
making; encourage demonstrators of different experiences of material value.
In parallel as large corporations grow ever stronger relative to short term 
government cycles, the over-riding obligation on company directors to 
maximise shareholder returns could be re-examined. Other corporate objectives, 
for example to maximise long term employee welfare, could be considered, 
along with other designs of boards, such as the German model with employee 
representation.
Appropriate use of economic models
Alfred Marshall defined four forms of welfare – social, religious, political and 
economic – yet recent UK policy decisions have been very narrowly focused 
on short term GDP growth as the over-arching measure of welfare. While the 
economic models of the sensitivity of GDP to marginal changes around a notional 
equilibrium have some empirical validation, these models are not appropriate 
to longer term strategic decision making which involves change far beyond the 
range of model validation. The government could take action to challenge the 
hegemony of these narrow economic models, requiring at the least an explicit 
assessment of how many assumptions are breached when models are used for 
strategic assessment 
Societal Readiness Levels
Many innovation policies are developed using Motorola’s famous scale of 
“Technology Readiness Levels.” These describe ten steps from first invention to 
widespread adoption of a new technology. The metamorphosis anticipated in 
this document could be described with a parallel scale of “Societal Readiness 
Levels” on which scale, material demand reduction is at a very early level. In 
preparation for deployment, a crucial requirement is to develop experience of 
living well with less material production, and the government could stimulate 
development of this experience through appropriate use of  procurement 
decisions and innovation policy.
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Response to green paper
1. Does this document identity the right areas of focus: extending 
our strengths; closing the gaps; and making the UK one of the most 
competitive places to start or grow a business?  A low carbon future 
will be a low energy future so the industrial strategy must be 
developed to embrace a wider but inevitable transformation. 
As early movers towards this inevitable goal, the UK could gain 
market advantage through skills and techniques that could be 
exported as others catch up.
2. Are the ten pillars suggested the right ones to tackle low 
productivity and unbalanced growth? If not, which areas are 
missing? This response suggests the following nuances to the 
ten pillars: 1. Investing in innovation depends on whether 
the UK has the complete supply chain of relevant production 
to exploit the resulting novelty. In order to achieve pillar 
1, the UK’s supply chains which have been hollowed out by 
globalisation should be reconnected. 3. A blanket target of 
upgrading infrastructure could lead to very high material 
demand, and this should be moderated where possible by 
adaptation of existing structures. 5. Government procurement 
has been cited for decades as a potential lever of change 
towards more environmentally sustainable activity. The 
right actions are written into procurement protocols but the 
civil servants charged with implementing the protocols are 
overwhelmed with other tasks so often unable to deliver. 6. The 
grounds of trade should be adjusted through border taxes to 
account for differing environmental standards internationally. 
7. Government policies on clean energy, which could be 
viewed as “picking winners” should be matched by an equal if 
not greater commitment to energy demand reduction. 8. The 
sector focus of the green paper should be transformed into a 
focus on world-leading supply chains. 9. A higher priority than 
growth is welfare, across a broad range of metrics of quality 
of life, and government action should prioritise those at the 
lowest end of any scale of welfare than an average measure.
3. Are the right central government and local institutions in place 
to deliver an effective industrial strategy? If not, how should they 
be reformed? This note has proposed the creation of a cross-
Whitehall public-private body to act as a “Materials Forum” to 
facilitate discussions about the bulk materials in the UK which 
currently have no place.
4. Are there important lessons we can learn from the industrial 
policies of other countries which are not reflected in these ten 
pillars? Sweden has the most environmentally sensitive 
policies and actively uses taxes across the board (including 
VAT and income tax) to encourage the more efficient use of 
emissions-intensive materials.
5. What should be the priority areas for science, research and 
innovation investment? This note draws attention to the need 
for funding to stimulate new alignments and partnerships to 
expand the solution space for a low energy industrial strategy, 
which is unlikely to emerge from continued funding of 
incumbent players within their existing configurations.
6. Which challenge areas should the Industrial Challenge Strategy 
Fund focus on to drive maximum economic impact? A low carbon 
future will be a low energy future and the UK is well placed to 
become a leader in finding the skills, systems and services that 
deliver high quality livelihoods with a greatly reduced demand 
for energy.
10. What more can we do to improve basic skills? Job design 
receives little attention when corporations are legally obliged 
to maximise the return to their shareholders as their top 
priority. An exploration of different options for corporate 
governance could lead to a quite different focus on employee 
welfare, and hence job content and skills development.
14. How can we enable and encourage people to retrain and upskill 
thoughout their working lives? A re-connection of conception 
and execution within employee jobs could transform 
motivations from those of wage-slaves to those of self-starters.
27. What are the most important steps the Government should 
take to limit energy costs over the long term? Energy pricing is 
a key mechanism to driving down energy demand, so prices 
should not be reduced. Instead, compensation mechanisms 
can be designed to redirect the income generated from energy 
sales and tax to stimulate the activities and innovations that 
will expand and prove satisfying in a low energy future.
29. How can the Government, business and researchers work 
together to develop the competitive opportunities from innovation 
in energy and our existing industrial strengths? A sector focus 
will perpetuate the retrospective priorities of incumbent 
businesses, where the supply-chain focus proposed in this 
document would stimulate the reconfiguration required to 
find a satisfying low energy future.  We can only innovate 
meaningfully in supply chains in which we are active producers. 
A critical missing component of the supply chain in the UK at 
present is in equipment manufacture and a strategic effort to 
re-develop this sector, for example through a concerted effort 
via the High Value Manufacturing Catapult, could both create a 
new channel for connecting UK research strength to industrial 
operation and be a global leader in developing technologies 
to support a low energy industrial future.
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THE TEN PILLARS SET OUT IN THE GREEN PAPER
1. Investing in science, research & innovation
2. Developing skills
3. Upgrading infrastructure
4. Supporting businesses to start and grow
5. Improving procurement
6. Encouraging trade & inward investment
7. Delivering affordable energy and clean growth
8. Cultivating world-leading sectors
9. Driving growth across the whole economy
10. Creating the right institutions to bring together sectors 
and places
30. How can the Government support businesses in realising cost 
savings through greater resource and energy efficiency? High 
energy prices encourage energy efficiency and material 
efficiency, and relay information on where to prioritise efforts. 
Material and energy cost saving strategies could be achieved 
by new forms of co-operation along the supply chain. The 
lack of incentives for property owners to upgrade the energy 
performance of their buildings when the benefits accrue to 
their tenants are well known.  Less well known but of similar 
magnitude are the opportunities along the construction 
supply chain to save material and promote building longevity 
by an earlier and richer connection between client, architect, 
structural designer, contractor and local planners.
31. How can the Government and industry help sectors come 
together to identify the opportunities for a ‘sector deal’ to address 
– especially where industries are fragmented or not well defined? 
The Green Building Council and the Government Chief Advisor 
on Construction proved an effective means to stimulate 
communication of opportunities across the construction 
supply chain. These mechanisms could be re-started and 
enhanced by wider stakeholder participation. Similar 
combinations of Council and Advisor could be configured for 
other key supply chains, including those for cars, aerospace, 
industrial equipment, food and so on.
32. How can the Government ensure that ‘sector deals’ promote 
competition and incorporate the interests of new entrants? A 
focus on supply chains rather than sectors would prioritise the 
delivery of solutions rather than intermediate goods and this 
is a better basis for competition and stimulating new entrants.
33. How can the Government and industry collaborate to 
enable growth in new sectors of the future that emerge around 
new technologies and new business models? New business 
opportunities emerge from technical innovations or changes 
in context. In the certainty that a low carbon future must 
be a low energy future, the UK has an excellent opportunity 
during the Brexit process to take strategic action to stimulate 
innovation in the development of a low energy industrial 
system with greatly reduced material demand. 
Comment questions 29-33: These five questions all 
address the relationship between government and business, 
but do not take account of any other stakeholder groups. If the 
dialogue includes the design of jobs and of high quality living 
these conversations could also usefully include representatives 
of trade unions, local communities and environmental lobby 
groups. 
36. Recognising the need for local initiatives and leadership, how 
should we best work with local areas to create and strengthen key 
local institutions? Local planning authorities have a powerful 
opportunity to influence the total material demand of the UK 
but currently do not deploy it. This could be stimulated through 
central government action to inform local governments of 
their opportunities and of examples of best practice. In the 
pursuit of more satisfying lives local government support for 
local arts, community and leisure activities could be given 
significantly greater priority.
37. What are the most important institutions which we need 
to upgrade or support to back growth in particular areas? The 
Whitehall policy development process is at present largely 
reactive and in assembling rapid responses to immediate 
public interests tends to draw largely on incumbent players, 
particularly on larger businesses with existing policy teams. 
This creates a very narrow level of dialogue over policy 
development and carries a significant danger that government 
is disproportionately supporting the owners of large 
businesses. A different model proposed in this document is 
to stimulate a much richer policy innovation ‘funnel’. A much 
wider and more representative group of stakeholders could be 
part of regular dialogue in preparing policy seedlings, which 
could be refined through a managed stage-gate development 
process to be ready when public interest and political will 
meet in future. 
In parallel, the document has recommended a cross-Whitehall 
public-private body to examine national materials issues, 
designed along the lines of the Energy Research Partnership. 
No Whitehall department has oversight of materials issues, 
and a forum for dialogue in this area would both increase 
communication within the civil service and also allow a wide 
range of organisations to contribute to policy development.
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1) Allwood et al (2012) explore options for living well with 
reduced material demand.
2) The UK Carbon Budgets translate the 2050 target from 
the UK Climate Change Act into 5-yearly committments. The 
second Carbon Budget demands a 19% reduction below 
1990 levels by 2017, the third carbon budget requires a 35% 
reduction below 1990 levels by 2020, the fourth Carbon 
Budget demands a 50% reduction below 1990 levels by 2025 
and the fifth Carbon Budget requires a 57% reduction below 
1990 levels by 2030.
3) Anderson & Peters (2016) interpret the commitment in 
the Paris Accord to limit Climate Change to “well below 2°C” 
as a 66% chance to limit global temperature increases to 2°C 
resulting in a permissible carbon budget of 600-1200Ct CO2 
and estimate that the continued use of fossil fuels, industrial 
emissions and land-use change reduce this budget by 40GtCO2 
per year.
4) According to Fuss et al. (2014)
5) These concerns are identified by Anderson & Peters (2016)
6)As part of its 2015 spending review, the Government 
withdrew support for a Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS) 
Commercialisation Programme that intended to provide capital 
grants and a Contract for Difference for up to two Carbon 
Capture and Storage demonstration plants no provision for 
CCS has been made under Contract for Difference to 2030 
and CCS has been removed from the National Infrastructure 
Delivery Plan 2016-2021.
7) Tighe (2016) describes the situation in Redcar one year after 
the closure of the plant.
8) Estimates of the cost of steelmaking are based on CCC 
(2015).
9) Ecofys (2015) conducted a study for the World Bank that 
identified 38 distinct carbon pricing schemes that cover 
approximately 12% of global emissions. 85% of the emissions 
covered by the schemes are priced at less than $10/tCO2.
Notes
10) Skelton & Allwood (2017) explore a range of reasons 
why carbon prices may offer imperfect incentives to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions through downstream measures 
such as greater material efficiency in the use of steel.
11) “The answer, I believe, is the introduction of border carbon 
adjustments to protect European competitiveness….Europe’s 
politicians need to ask themselves what success really looks 
like. An outcome where jobs are exported and carbon is 
imported — with no meaningful impact on total global 
emissions? Or a fair and equitable policy that incentivises 
investment and reduces emissions, while enabling the long-
term sustainability of Europe’s steel industry?” (Mittal, 2017)
12) In a recent response to the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Built Environment (HM Government 2016) 
the Government stated “Under the current legal framework 
the zero-rate of VAT can only be applied to residential 
or charitable property that is either newly constructed, 
converted from commercial to residential use, renovated 
after a prolonged period without use, or is a listed building 
that has been substantially reconstructed,” the government 
says in its response. “Until negotiations on our departure from 
the European Union are complete, our rights and obligations 
remain unchanged. That includes the application of EU VAT 
rules.” in response to the Lords claim that the 20% rate on 
repairs to buildings “provides a perverse disincentive to the 
retention, restoration and revitalisation of historic buildings, 
and works to prevent owners from looking after them 
properly” .
13) Figure 5 is based on data on the over-specification of steel 
in buildings from Dunant et al. (forthcoming), assuming 10% 
yield losses for structural steel. Yied losses for the automotive 
sector are based on industry data provided by Horton & 
Allwood (forthcoming). The excess steel in cars is calculated 
by comparing the industry average car body mass to the car 
body mass of a Renault Twingo (the lightest 5 seater car in the 
sample).
14) Summary table based on in depth work in the automotive 
sector by Horton & Allwood (forthcoming) and the construction 
sector by Dunant et al. (forthcoming)
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